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Abstract 
Within the field of the organisation of science, concerns about how academics generate patents tend to focus on a 
single set of either national or international patents. The main aim of this research is to study both national and 
international patenting in order to understand their differences. We have approached this issue from both a 
historical and an economic perspective, using data from the Spanish National Research Council (CSIC), the 
largest PRO in Spain. Three periods can be distinguished in the CSIC’s history, according to the political 
context, namely the dictatorship (1939-1975), the transition to democracy (1976-1986) and democracy (1987-to 
date). The prevailing legal and institutional framework has marked the way in which patenting by CSIC has 
evolved in each of these periods. The current situation is one in which there is strong internationalisation of 
patenting activity, and in this most-recent period we explore trends in some of the economic influences on 
patenting activity. We conclude that the political and normative context may shape the culture of international 
patenting at PROs like the CSIC and that increasing technological cooperation has supported this 
internationalisation. However, very often foreign partners are included in the application in order to extend 
protection abroad for commercial reasons, so their number may not be a good indicator of inventive activity.  
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Introduction 
University patents have become an important object of analysis because they reflect changes in 
knowledge production and diffusion; they are an indicator of research results that may be taken into 
account in the evaluation of merits and a potential instrument for technology transfer. Studies carried 
out to date have tended to apply a single disciplinary perspective, e.g. historical (Mowery and Sampat, 
2001; Metlay, 2006), economic (Feller, 1990; Pavitt, 1998), or scientometric, etc.  
Elsewhere we have shown that similar debates should be extended to the other main knowledge 
producer in the public R&D system, namely Public Research Organisations (PROs), and that a 
multidisciplinary approach allows for a richer interpretation of the results (Azagra and Romero, 2006). 
In this paper we apply this philosophy to the study of a question that is little examined in the literature: 
what are the factors leading academic institutions to patent abroad? While most studies focus their 
attention on just one set of patents, one of the authors has shown that differences among sets of patents 
matter in the analysis of how they are generated, e.g. national vs. international patents, since they may 
lead to normative conclusions (Azagra, Yegros and Archontakis, 2006). 
Our object of study will be the Spanish Council for Scientific Research (CSIC), the largest PRO in 
Spain according to its historical trajectory, its resources, its wide regional implantation and its 
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multidisciplinarity across research units. It is also very active in patenting, currently accounting for 
more than 10 percent of Spanish patent applications. 
Patent internationalisation processes 
Sovereign states legislate on intellectual property rights. Inventors can apply for a patent through their 
respective national patent offices. Most developed countries now allow universities to apply for 
patents and license them.  
The traditional way to protect knowledge abroad is to apply for a patent in the foreign country 
concerned, which requires a separate administrative procedure in each country. To simplify this 
process, some countries have signed international treaties allowing applications for patents in their 
territory to be made through a common procedure. Citizens of the participating countries can designate 
in which of these countries they want protection, including their own. 
A country’s decision to promote internationalisation by means of a treaty is a specific regulatory 
change which deserves attention. The aim is not to increase the number of patents per se but to 
facilitate patenting abroad. However, this option may make patenting more attractive to applicants, 
thus increasing the number of patents overall. 
Most European countries participate in two main pacts of this kind. The first is the Patent Cooperation 
Treaty (PCT) (Washington, 1970), which gave rise to the so-called PCT patent. The second is the 
European Patent Agreement (EPA) (Munich, 1973), which gave rise to the so-called European Patent1. 
Applications are made through the International Office of the World Industrial Property Organisation 
and the European Patent Office (EPO), respectively, but national patent offices may also start the 
procedure.2 However, we should point out that, unlike the EPA, the PCT system does not directly lead 
to the granting or refusal of a patent. Rather it provides a uniform procedure for processing and 
handling applications. 
From dictatorship to democracy in Spain: milestones in the history of internationalisation of the 
CSIC 
The CSIC was created after the civil war in 1939. The new leaders felt that the best way to control and 
organise research activity was to group or divide it into boards. The history of the Board of Technical 
Research (Patronato Juan de la Cierva, hereafter PJC) and therefore the work carried out at its offices 
cannot be studied separately from the situation in which Spain found itself, not only after the civil war 
but also after the Second World War. Spain's difficult international position, in addition to the 
regime’s political need not to acknowledge anything prior to 1936, turned this external and internal 
isolation into a liability that took a long time to eradicate. In the post-war situation, the individual 
interests of companies had to give way to national interest, and this shaped the structure of the CSIC 
as the overall aim was to make it the basis of the mobilisation of science to serve the major national 
concerns. 
1977 was a year of change for the CSIC: a new internal structure was put into place which included 
the first democratic mechanisms. 1986, which was a watershed in Spanish science policy, is the last of 
the outstanding historical milestones for this article. This was the year in which the Act to Promote 
and Generally Coordinate Scientific and Technical Research, the so-called “Science Act” (Act 
13/1986, Official State Bulletin of 18th April 1986), was passed. Although this Act must also be 
viewed in the context of Spain's joining the European Economic Community, we should not forget 
that it was the result of the growing awareness of the importance of scientific research for Spain. The 
new organisational design and control mechanisms created by the Act were intended to be more 
effective, so as to be capable both of managing new funding and handling the creation of initiatives 
such as the National Plan for Scientific Research and Technological Development in 1988. However, 
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the Act also sought to provide a response to the new situations brought about by the arrival of 
democracy. 
The engagement in the process of internationalisation of patents also received strong regulatory 
support during this period. In July 1986, although it did not become effective until October 1987, 
Spain joined the EPA. Another important factor to bear in mind is Spain's joining the PCT, which 
came into force in November 1989. The PCT system normally used by the CSIC to place its patents on 
the international market has advantages, as it facilitates the application procedure at an international 
level. 
Data and methods 
The historical approach 
The patent data used in this article come from various sources. For the case of patents applied for 
during the period when the CSIC was organised into Boards (1939-1975), the historical database of 
the Spanish Patents and Trademarks Office (OEPM) was used. Here we could only find patents 
applied for by the PJC, despite our exhaustive search for patents applied for by all the Boards. We 
subsequently completed and compared the database with data from the PJC Annual Reports. 
The data used for the period 1975 to 2005 were those kept by the CSIC's Technology Transfer Office 
(TTO) together with a database generated using information published in the CSIC's Annual Reports, 
which allowed us to associate CSIC patents with specific research units and, through these, to ascribe 
them to specific scientific areas and regions.  
The first patents registered by the OEPM from the PJC were in 1949, the year when the analysis 
therefore starts. Chronologically, three periods have been established. These respond to the historical 
and legislative changes already mentioned. The first period runs from 1949 to 1975, the year when 
structural changes in the CSIC brought about the disappearance of the boards. The second, shorter, 
period extends from 1976 to 1986, the year when Spain joined the EEC and two Acts were passed 
which were decisive for patents in Spain: the Patent Act and the Science Act. The third period started 
in 1987 and lasted until 2005. Within this time framework, we have analysed the variations in patent 
applications, the scientific areas concerned, the spatial distribution, collaboration with other groups or 
research units and the connections between Spanish scientists and the outside world.  
The economic approach3 
The more recent data is more detailed, so the question is how to choose the appropriate cut-off point. 
The historical approach justifies defining the late period, 1987-2005, for the economic analysis, given 
the more uniform legal and institutional framework. This is an example of cross-fertilisation between 
the two approaches.  
The historical approach employs data from the CSIC's TTO in the late period that we also use here. It 
consists of a set of 2,793 patents applied for by the CSIC. We classified them by an average of 95 
CSIC research units per year and 19 years (1987-2005), so we built a 1,812-observation panel. As far 
as we are aware, this is one of the largest databases in Europe for the study of public patents at the 
institutional level. 
We applied count data econometric models in order to estimate the determinants of CSIC patents. The 
independent variables include those on collaboration patterns from the same TTO database: logarithm 
of number of co-applicants, by type (other CSIC research units, other PROs, universities4, businesses 
and other institutions) and nationality (Spanish and foreign). 
A second database from the CSIC’s annual reports allows us to include other independent variables on 
the research units’ characteristics. These are total staff (in logs) and their composition (proportion of 
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CSIC civil servants, CSIC working staff, university personnel and other personnel –mainly 
temporary), amount of financial activities per capita (national projects, other projects, contracts, in 
logs), scientific area, region5 and being part of a service centre –an institution for the joint 
management of research units. 
We are looking at research units, and some of them may behave like outliers that we have to detect. 
Actually, there is one in the sample, the Institute of Chemistry (ITQ)6, so we created a dummy variable 
to allow it to have a separate intercept. 
Finally, we controlled for time differences over the length of each CSIC presidency under each 
political party in the government. There were eight CSIC presidents and three political parties in Spain 
during the period of observation. 
The growth of international patenting by the CSIC, 1949-2005 
1949-1975: limited internationalisation 
Although only sixteen PJC applications were registered outside Spain in this first period, it is worth 
devoting them some attention. 1971 was the first year when Spanish patents were registered abroad. 
Places in Europe such as France, Belgium, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Holland, Poland, Norway, 
Yugoslavia, Russia and Turkey were chosen. Nevertheless, Spanish interest did not focus solely on 
Europe; the data indicate that patents were also registered outside the continent: the other countries 
reached by PJC patents being the United States, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Morocco, 
Algeria, Japan and Australia. Spain's position after the Second World War, in particular the regime's 
policy of autarky, and the subsequent agreements with the United States, all undoubtedly affected the 
country's scientific life. Nevertheless, this is perhaps an appropriate point at which to mention the 
Cultural Relations Board, an organisation dependent on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as it allows us 
to tackle an important point when analysing the use abroad of knowledge generated by the CSIC, 
namely the training of Spanish scientists in foreign research centres. This was one of the underlying 
principles of the JAE, the CSIC’s precursor, and forms part of the legacy that José Maria Albareda, 
general secretary/junior minister of the CSIC, took on and tried to strengthen (Delgado and Elizalde, 
2005). This situation is explained by the relations established by the scientists themselves. 
1976-1986: incipient internationalisation 
In this period, between 1976 and 1986, some degree of internationalisation also took place. There were 
sixteen patent applications for protection outside Spain. In Europe, the countries where patents were 
applied for were Germany, Belgium, France, Holland, Italy and Yugoslavia. This period was also 
marked by an outstanding lack of presence of Spanish research abroad. In this period the focus was on 
the internal organisation of the body, starting up new policies and implementing new regulations 
whose results would be felt in later years. 
1987-2005: strong internationalisation 
This period saw an increase in patent applications, starting in the 80's and continuing into the mid-90 
when there was another significant jump. Table 1 allows us to evaluate more precisely what this 
growth really meant. First are the total patent applications by the CSIC throughout this period. In the 
next three columns, there is a breakdown of this total. The second column includes each year’s 
applications in Spain. The third column shows foreign applications directly applied for abroad through 
national procedures. The final column contains data on international extensions, i.e. families of the 
two former sets, generated following patent applications through an international procedure.   
The data for total applications in this period show growth at the end of the 80's which, over the years, 
not only consolidates but even almost triples during the following years. This growth not only justifies 
the necessary legislation on patents but is also a reflection of the different regulations initiated during 
the last few years of the 70's and principally the 80's. This is the time when, within the Ministry of 
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6 ITQ holds 20% of all patent applications. The next research unit just holds 8%. 
Education and Science, the Secretary of State for Universities and Research and the General 
Directorate of Scientific Policy were created. 
During the late 80’s, the number of CSIC Spanish applications almost coincided with the number of 
CSIC total applications. Up until 1995 they accounted for more than 50 percent. From 1995 onwards, 
there was a reversal and international patents (the sum of foreign applications plus international 
extensions) came to account for more than half of the total. As already mentioned, a change took place 
after Spain joined the European Community, with all this entailed. Of course, after the EPA and the 
PCT came into force direct foreign applications are rare as compared with international extensions.  
Table 1. CSIC patent applications (1987-2005) 
Years Total  Spanish 
applications 
Foreign applications International 
extensions 
1987 9 9 0 0 
1988 19 19 0 0 
1989 45 43 0 2 
1990 62 42 0 20 
1991 54 25 1 28 
1992 44 27 0 17 
1993 68 31 0 37 
1994 65 37 0 28 
1995 57 37 0 20 
1996 102 51 0 51 
1997 142 63 1 78 
1998 190 63 3 124 
1999 243 94 4 145 
2000 238 101 4 133 
2001 250 98 1 151 
2002 342 123 2 217 
2003 316 94 3 219 
2004 251 102 4 145 
2005 296 111 8 177 
Total  2793 1170 31 1592 
 
A variety of information is available making it possible to analyse these data in more detail. The 
countries that received the greatest number of Spanish patent applications between 1987 and 2005 
were the United States (154), Japan (69), Canada (65), the United Kingdom (54) and France (50). 
Other interesting facts are that, during this period, 487 applications were processed in the international 
market via the PCT treaty and 168 applications were processed via the EPA. These data suggest 
institutional strategies but at the same time, and related to the previous point, they also lead us to think 
some scientific areas are more highly internationalised than others. 
An analysis of patent families according by scientific area offers an answer to the question as to 
whether there are areas which are more accustomed to applying for patents abroad or traditionally 
have a stronger propensity to do so. Because the areas of Chemistry and Biology & Biomedicine are 
those applying for most patents, both nationally and internationally, a difference can be seen in the 
countries designated to obtain protection. In the Chemistry area, it is of interest to protect knowledge 
most in the United States, then in Japan, Canada, the United Kingdom and France. On the other hand, 
in the area of Biology & Biomedicine, patents were applied for in countries such as the United States, 
Canada and Japan and, unlike the previous case, Australia. 
Table 2. Determinants of the number of CSIC patents by research unit and year 
 Number of CSIC Spanish applications  
Number of CSIC international extensions 
 
Best-fit model Zero Altered Neg. Binomial Regression  Negative Binomial Regression 
Number of observations  1,812 1,812 
Poisson-associated R2 0.55 0.76 
Log likelihood function -1,363.13 -1,098.77 
Prob[χ2>value] = 0.00 0.00 
   
 Coeff. (t-ratio) Coeff. (t-ratio) 
Constant -1.51 (-5.6) ** -10.03 (-11.47) ** 
Technological cooperation with   
Other CSIC research units 0.74 (5.39) ** 0.42 (2.19) * 
Other national PROs 1.16 (1.96) * 1.79 (2.66) ** 
Foreign PROs 1.56 (0.33)   1.02 (3.58) ** 
National universities 0.78 (6) ** 0.51 (2.88) ** 
Foreign universities 0.7 (1.6)   0.66 (2.06) * 
National business firms 1 (4.21) ** 1.29 (8.29) ** 
Foreign business firms 0.13 (0.09)   1.18 (4.73) ** 
Other institutions -0.25 (-0.38)   1.3 (1.49)   
Human capital   
Total staff 0.33 (6.54) ** 1.49 (10.86) ** 
Proportion of CSIC civil servants -0.04 (-0.28)   1.79 (3.52) ** 
Proportion of CSIC working staff -0.67 (-2.78) ** -3.25 (-3.02) ** 
Proportion of university personnel -0.55 (-3.21) ** -0.72 (-1.02)   
Financial capital   
National projects 0.06 (2.03) * -0.09 (-0.79)   
Other projects 0.03 (1.46)   0.14 (1.58)   
Contracts 0 (0.09)   0.03 (0.55)   
Scientific area   
Chemistry 0.41 (5.95) ** 0.91 (4.77) ** 
Food 0.4 (4.95) ** 0.63 (2.62) ** 
Materials 0.35 (4.98) ** -0.09 (-0.45)   
Agriculture 0.11 (1.71)   -0.4 (-1.37)   
Natural resources -0.15 (-2.47) ** -1.38 (-3.94) ** 
Region   
Andalusia 0.16 (1.87)   0.94 (1.82)   
Valencian Community 0.13 (1.27)   0.78 (1.42)   
Madrid 0.08 (0.98)   0.76 (1.46)   
Asturias 0.19 (0.99)   -28.89 (-0.32)   
Catalonia -0.01 (-0.15)   0.15 (0.27)   
Galicia 0.04 (0.39)   -1.22 (-1.45)   
Aragon -0.06 (-0.6)   0.61 (1.04)   
Murcia -0.14 (-0.87)   0.65 (0.91)   
Canary Islands -0.23 (-1.51)   0.7 (0.99)   
Service centre 0.22 (4) ** 0.92 (5.56) ** 
ITQ 1.82 (12.39) ** 3.74 (8.16) ** 
CSIC president_Party in the government   
Pres1_Party1 -0.08 (-1.2)   -3.46 (-3.8) ** 
Pres2_Party1 0.08 (1.23)   -0.29 (-1.01)   
Pres3_Party1 -0.13 (-1.08)   0.15 (0.29)   
Pres4_Party2 0.09 (0.44)   0.06 (0.08)   
Pres5_Party2 0.13 (2.34) ** 0.86 (4.03) ** 
Pres6_Party2 0.22 (3.35) ** 1.41 (6.12) ** 
Pres7_Party2 0.14 (1.71)   1.04 (3.37) ** 
Pres8_Party1 0.17 (1.49)   1.86 (5.07) ** 
α 0.13 (2.14) * 1.33 (8.68) ** 
τ -5.24 (-5.37) **  
** Significant at 1%. * Significant at 5% 
Determinants of CSIC international patents by research unit in the late period, 1987-2005 
In Table 2 we show our favourite specifications according to the tests conducted: a zero inflated 
negative binomial model for Spanish national patents and a standard negative binomial regression for 
international extensions. We did not try to fit a model for direct international patents since their 
number was so small. 
According to the estimates, cooperation with other national PROs and national businesses has the 
largest positive effect on patent production7. Having other CSIC research units and Spanish 
universities as co-applicants also enhances national patent production, but to a lesser extent. 
Cooperation with other institutions does not have a significant effect on the production of CSIC 
patents. Until now, this has been valid for both national and international patents. When it comes to 
foreign partners, some differences arise. While cooperation with foreign PROs, foreign universities 
and foreign firms is not significant in terms of increasing national patents, it is positively significant 
for increasing international patents.  
Regarding human capital, the higher the number of total staff, the more likely it is that CSIC research 
units will generate national and international patents.  
Research units with a higher proportion of CSIC civil servants (42% on average) patent through the 
national route as much as those with a higher proportion of other personnel –the benchmark (38% on 
average). Research units with a higher proportion of CSIC working staff (10% on average) and 
university personnel (10% on average) patent significantly less than the former through the national 
route.8 Having a higher proportion of CSIC civil servants also boosts the number of applications for 
international patent extensions, whereas a higher proportion of CSIC working staff also diminishes it.  
Regarding financial capital, the per capita number of national projects leads to a higher number of 
national patents but not to more extensions. No other funding actions are conducive to more patents. 
It is important to control for differences between scientific areas, since some of them have a higher 
propensity to patent. The ranking is as follows: Chemistry and Food areas patent more than the 
average; Materials has also more national patents but not more international patents than the average; 
Physics, Biology & Biomedicine and Agriculture represent the average; Natural Resources patent less 
than average. 
We have also controlled for regional variation, which does not seem to affect patenting. On the other 
hand, being part of a service centre is highly positive for patenting. 
The ITQ is actually an outlier. Its propensity to apply for patents needs to be controlled for in order to 
moderate the impact of other effects. The significant positive sign indicates that it stands out from 
other research units in terms of both national and international patents. 
The effect of successive CSIC presidencies allows us to distinguish between two sub-periods during 
the period of observation. The propensity of CSIC research units to apply for international patent 
protection significantly increased from the fifth president onwards. This corresponds to the shift 
attributed to internationalisation by the historical approach. The impact is not so clear-cut in the case 
of national patents, however. Although there was an increase under presidents 5 and 6, this was not 
subsequently sustained. 
By contrast, it is worth noting that under president 4 patenting activity was the same regardless of 
whether party 1 or 2 was in government9. Moreover, the rise of patents continued at the end of the 
period regardless of which party was in power. This suggests that changes of government have not 
been influential. 
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between national patents and international extension. For more discussion on the implications of the models, see 
Azagra and Romero (2006). 
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universities. It looks as though mixing research with teaching has advantages and costs and the outcome depends 
on the context (Martin, 2003). 
9 Pres4_Party1 is the benchmark. 
Conclusions 
From the historical point of view, the eventual configuration of a clearer institutional and legal 
framework has bolstered the CSIC’s international patenting. In 1986, the so-called Science Act came 
into force, in conjunction with Spain’s joining the European Union and the enactment of the Spanish 
Constitution and the country’s territorial and administrative reorganisation. 
The late eighties were also crucial because numerous other legislative changes took place. Until 1986, 
patent law in Spain had not been reformed since 1929. Spain’s joining the European Union forced it to 
adapt to European legislation. The 1986 Patent Act made it possible for Spain to patent chemical, 
pharmaceutical and food technologies for the first time. Moreover, in July 1986 Spain joined the EPA, 
which allowed patent applications to be made through a centralised system. Soon afterwards, Spain 
joined the PCT, the system most extensively used by the CSIC to internationalise its patents. 
Once this general framework was in place, the economic approach shows that the effect on the rise in 
international extensions by the CSIC became significant after a lag of a few years, when the 
presidential style of the CSIC assumed these cultural changes. Moreover, the changes were solid 
enough as to be independent of later changes of the political party in government. One could speculate 
as to whether the absence of any influence by more recent governments is due to parties on both left 
and right no longer espousing different approaches to PRO patents. 
The historical approach finds that technological cooperation has tended to stimulate the CSIC to make 
patent applications. There is a parallelism between the increase in the number of patents and the 
increase in the number of participants in their production. Moreover, this process runs in parallel with 
the trend towards the internationalisation of patents, which it is not merely a coincidence. 
The economic approach quantifies the impact of technological cooperation in the later period and finds 
a significant relationship with patenting at the CSIC. While domestic partners are more conducive to 
patent production in general, foreign partners are also advantageous for international extensions. A 
second reading is that once the CSIC has applied for Spanish patents, it searches for foreign partners to 
help it extend protection abroad10. Hence, foreign institutions, especially foreign firms, are expected to 
provide commercial expertise rather than inventive knowledge. Studies on a single set of patents 
which predict that a higher number of foreign applicants will increase the number of patents should be 
cautious about the interpretation of the reasons why it may occur. 
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